We assume that parents use the signalling intensity of their young to determine how much food they bring to the nest, and that the pattern of food allocation is determined by the signalling intensity and by the intensity of other nonsignalling behaviours that are not perceived by the parents. We explore different ways in which signalling, nonsignalling behaviours and competitive asymmetries might interact to determine food allocation. In Model 0 only signalling affects food allocation. More competitive chicks beg less and obtain a greater share of the food than their smaller siblings. In Model 1, a linear combination of signalling and nonsignalling behaviours determines food allocation. When nonsignalling behaviours are the main determinant of food allocation, chicks do not signal and parents deliver a fixed amount of food. Larger chicks receive a greater share of this food. When both types of behaviour are equally weighted, the pattern of investment depends on competitive asymmetry. For low asymmetry levels, both chicks invest in signalling. For large asymmetries, the less competitive chick invests in signalling and the more competitive chick invests in nonsignalling behaviours. In Model 2, the product of signalling and nonsignalling intensities determines food allocation. Larger chicks invest more in signalling and less in nonsignalling behaviours. Larger chicks get more food than their siblings. Overall chicks waste more resources when signalling evolves. Hence, if natural selection could act on the mechanism of food distribution, we would expect signalling to play a minor role in the actual pattern of allocation of resources.
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Food solicitations are almost ubiquitous in species with parental care. To explain their evolution, Godfray (1991 Godfray ( , 1995 proposed game-theoretical models based on the handicap principle (Zahavi 1987; Grafen 1990 ) and showed that a signalling equilibrium exists between a parent and its young if signalling is costly. The signalling equilibrium derived by Godfray (1991), however, was shown to be unstable in computer simulations (Rodríguez-Gironés et al. 1998 ). These simulations questioned the validity of the model's assumptions and forced us to reconsider the evolution and stability of food solicitations. Rodríguez-Gironés (1999) has shown that introducing direct sibling competition stabilizes the signalling equilibrium; we refer to this model as the sibling competition model. The possibility that other factors, as yet ignored, may also stabilize the signalling equilibrium deserves further study. The sibling competition model works in the following way. Assume that, in a two-chick brood, chick i (i=A, B) invests a certain effort into procuring food, x i . (All the symbols used in this paper are listed in Appendix 1.) This begging effort is a function of the condition of the chick, c i . The parent observes the begging effort of each chick and gets information about the condition of its offspring. The parent uses this information to determine the level of investment in the current brood, Y tot . So far, the assumptions correspond to those of other begging models. But the sibling competition model departs from signalling models in a key assumption. It assumes that the parent has no control over food allocation between chicks. According to the sibling competition model, the amounts of food consumed by chicks are determined by their relative begging efforts, regardless of whether this allocation pattern corresponds to the one maximizing the expected fitness of the parent. Following Parker et al.
